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The World Conference on Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development noted in 1989 that “land avail-
ability was not a major problem in the context of 
most African countries” (WCARRD 1998: 17). 
Since then however, some of the continent’s most 
serious conflicts (e.g. in Rwanda and Ivory Coast) 
have been linked to problems related to land 
availability and ownership. Access to land is be-
coming problematic in many African countries as 
land use and tenure frontiers shift. Three major 
land policies prevailed in Africa in the early 1980s. 
In some countries, there was a shift towards the 
socialization of land through cooperatives and 
state farms (e.g. in Mozambique). In others, pri-
vatization and individualization of land ownership 
was initiated or continued (e.g. in Malawi and 
Kenya). And yet other countries adapted existing 
tenures to modify relations between tribal chiefs 
and the state (e.g. in the Gambia and Lesotho). A 
move towards the second type (i.e. individuali-
zation and privatization) seems currently to be the 
most popular. 
 
The concept of land rights 
Land tenure concepts define how individuals gain access 
to and acquire rights over land either temporarily or 
permanently. There are many ways in which rights to land 
are laid down. Title deeds may have been given (statutory 
law) or land may have been transferred by traditional laws 
of succession (customary law). Statutory law divides land 
into two categories:  
i) Private - land that is owned, held or occupied under a 
freehold title, a leasehold title, a certificate or 
claim, or that is registered as private land 
under a Registered Land Act. 
ii) Public - land that is occupied, used or acquired by 
the government and any other land that is 
not customary land or private land. 
Land held under customary law can be communally used, 
individually used or may be reserve land (that has not yet 
been allocated). 
It should be stressed that “private” and “individual” are 
often used synonymously. This is not correct as private 
land can be held communally (e.g. a group ranch), while 
individual property exists under customary law (e.g. 
ownership of a well).  
 
This seems to be in line with recent statements by 
the Peruvian scholar, Hernando De Soto, who ar-
gues that a lack of easily understandable, formal 
property rights explains why people in developing 
countries have not been able to transform their 
(natural) resources into productive capital. His 
claim has been welcomed by national and interna-
tional policy makers struggling to improve devel-
oping countries’ economies over the last fifty 
years.  
 
 
Map 1 Kajiado District, Kenya 
(Since 2007 split into Kajiado and Loitokitok districts) 
 
This Infosheet is based on longitudinal research 
carried out among Maasai pastoralists in Kajiado 
District, Kenya since the late 1980s. The findings 
seriously question De Soto’s claim that formalized 
property rights result in investment, the sustain-
able use of resources and, ultimately, wealth cre-
ation by new individual property holders. 
  
The evolution of land ownership in the Maasai 
area in Kenya can be divided into five major 
periods. 
1. The arrival of Europeans and the setting up 
of Maasai reserves: 1890-1920 
British colonizers introduced formal land tenure in 
Kenya. The local administration wanted to attract 
as many white settlers as possible and called for a 
settler-friendly land policy and legislation. African 
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land rights were overruled and violated in every 
respect and, as a result, Maasai pastoralists lost 
their best grazing areas, something that is still be-
ing challenged today.  
In 1904 the Maasai lost 35-40% of their land 
after signing a treaty with the British that divided 
Maasai territory into northern and southern re-
serves. In 1911 the Second Maasai Treaty was 
signed, making it possible to move the Maasai 
from the north to an extended southern reserve. 
However, some localities within this reserve were 
heavily infested with tsetse flies and/or lacked 
water.  
2. The period of neglect: 1921-1944 
The Colonial Office in London published a White 
Paper in 1923 that denied responsible govern-
ment to the settlers and stated that the interests of 
the African population should be paramount. This 
declaration turned out to be hollow and the land 
policy was left unchanged. However, the Native 
Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930 stated that non-
natives could only obtain leases or one-year licen-
ces for land in the reserves if it was not occupied 
or required by Africans. 
The Maasai repeatedly protested the loss of 
their land to the Kenya Land Commission, which 
was set up in 1932 to review African land grievan-
ces. The KLC’s report reaffirmed the administra-
tion’s policy towards pastoralists by opposing any 
extension of their land.  
3.  Grazing scheme experiments: 1945-1963 
After 1947, three grazing schemes were estab-
lished with funds released through the African 
Land Development Programme. The idea of com-
munal land ownership was unofficially dropped as 
early as 1950 by the Department of Agriculture.  
 
 
Maasai hauling a weakened cow back onto her feet 
 
Neither the Land Bank nor the commercial 
banks were interested in lending money to African 
farmers without individual security. Traditional 
land tenure had to be removed as it was thought 
to block the intensification of African agriculture. 
The creation of a landless class in the future was 
predicted but considered a normal step in a 
country’s evolution. By late 1952, drought had 
resulted in the deaths of a considerable proportion 
of the Maasai’s stock, which ultimately changed 
the plan to divide the district into ranch units.  
After 1954, local Maasai politicians started to 
illegally acquire 2000-acre individual ranches. 
Young politicians in particular created a political 
clientele by handing out title deeds to supporters 
and reducing the social and economic dominance 
exerted by elders who opposed this development. 
Colonial administrators expressed their concern 
but did not actively intervene. 
4.  The setting up of group ranches: 1964-1980 
Support for the elders came from the 1965 Law-
rance Mission that criticized the government’s 
haphazard approach to the Maasai land question 
and the illegal granting of approval for individual 
ranches. The Maasai all accepted the group ranch 
concept in 1969, which was introduced by the 
World Bank and implemented as the Kenya Live-
stock Development Project. 
 
 
 Fences in Maasailand 
 
The idea of a group ranch meant the setting 
aside of land for communal ownership by a group 
registered as the legal owners through member-
ship of the ranch in question. Non-members would 
not be allowed to bring their animals to graze 
there. Through the provision of loans for infra-
structural development and steer fattening, an at-
tempt was made to radically transform the noma-
dic subsistence-oriented milk economy into a se-
dentary, market-oriented meat production system. 
This was to bring about a destocking of Maasai 
pastures while also providing meat for national 
and international markets. 
In addition to welcoming the idea of water pro-
vision, veterinary care, improved livestock breeds 
and the like, a major rationale for accepting the 
group ranch proposal was to prevent elite Maasai 
from grabbing land and non-Maasai from settling 
in the district because the status of “closed dis-
tricts” had been removed by the late 1960s. The 
group ranches fulfilled both these objectives. 
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Problems included delays in implementation; 
disappointing rates of investment and difficulties in 
loan repayments; a continued trespassing of 
group ranch boundaries; refusal to destock; no 
real transformation to market-oriented production; 
and corruption among ranch committees. 
The group ranch concept, which was intro-
duced by outsiders, was an artificial creation that 
lacked a firm traditional, sociological as well as 
ecological basis. Its implementation was over-
ambitious in aiming to destock pastures and com-
mercialize production while barely taking into ac-
count pastoralist strategies. The final outcome 
was a growing desire among many Maasai to 
subdivide the group ranch into individual shares. 
5.  The dissolution of group ranches and the 
individualization of land ownership 
No clear position was taken by the government in 
the early 1980s on the subdivision of group 
ranches, apparently because the administration 
itself had some doubts about it and the individual 
departments were at odds with each other. 
Supporters of group ranch subdivision said it 
would raise living standards, increase the chances 
of procuring loans using the freehold title deed as 
collateral, minimize the exploitation of the poor by 
rich households, promote Maasai engagement in 
agricultural and industrial enterprises, and facili-
tate better maintenance of existing infrastructure. 
In general, those opposing subdivision claimed 
that ultimately the result would be the loss of land 
to non-Maasai, severe erosion in areas where cul-
tivation started, a loss of Maasai culture, and re-
strictions on the movement of wildlife and live-
stock to the detriment of the district’s meat pro-
duction and tourism. 
 
 
Map 2 Olkinos sales 1990 and 2000 
 
These arguments have been researched in a 
group of 500 Maasai households using repeat sur-
veys since 1989 but here only the monetary and 
juridical effects of the individualization of land 
ownership are reviewed, namely the buying, sel-
ling and mortgaging of land The survey addressed 
the pros and cons of the process of individual land 
titling within the context of De Soto’s claims that 
formal property rights would increase household 
and individual incentives to invest and would pro-
vide them with better access to credit. 
Experiences in Kenya during the subdivision of 
the Maasai group ranches in Kajiado District, how-
ever, challenge this bold claim. The formalization 
of individual land rights has not triggered a wide-
spread run on financial institutions by local farm 
owners, nor has it benefited the majority economi-
cally. 
 
 
Map 3 Olkinos mortgagees 1990 and 2000 
 
In contrast, the formalization process has 
brought severe problems for many of the original 
landowners following the sale of (part of) their 
land. The beneficiaries have mainly been specu-
lators and new immigrants, with the latter either 
having acquired a small piece of land for crop cul-
tivation or having found a job on one of the new 
flower or tree farms or at an educational institu-
tion. This influx of new economic activity has to a 
certain extent been responsible for the overall 
heightened strain on natural resources, notably 
water, and has put pressure on the sustainability 
and resilience of livestock keeping, the area’s 
main economic activity. As a result, severe forms 
of poverty of a more structural nature are creeping 
into Maasai society.  
In short, the role property rights can play in 
benefiting less well-off members of society will in 
reality be less easy to achieve and might be more 
of a threat to these groups, leaving opportunities 
for a minority of foreigners, immigrants, the edu-
cated elite and well-informed politicians. Tables 1 
and 2 summarize the positive and negative effects 
of the process of individual land titling. 
The same arguments De Soto put forward in 
favour of formal land rights were used in the 
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1960s by the World Bank and the UNDP, and 
again in the 1980s by those in favour of subdi-
viding group ranches. None fully realized or 
wanted to acknowledge the possible negative side 
effects for a large number of Maasai people, their 
children, the district's ecology, the livestock eco-
nomy, wildlife and tourism. As a result, the pro-
cess started without clear guidelines and amongst 
a group of people who were not yet ready to 
withstand the clamour for land within modern-day 
Kenya.  
 
Table 1 Positive effects of individual land ownership 
Direct 
 Restricts the misuse of grazing by neighbouring 
ranchers 
 Wealthy herders rent land from poor pastoralists 
 The misuse of loans by corrupt committees is not 
possible 
 Flexibility in pasture management is reintroduced 
Indirect 
 Job opportunities in the mining and flower industries 
 The Maasai copy immigrants’ activities, improvements 
in cultivation, modern houses, water facilities 
 Extra fodder (Napier) is being grown 
 Bartering of livestock (products) for maize/beans 
 Informal self-help groups invest money and labour in 
steer fattening, breed improvements and wells 
 
 
Table 2    Negative effects of individual land ownership 
Direct 
 The livestock system is undermined by removing (high-
potential) land from the pastoral migration cycle 
 There is reduced access to land (sales, fencing, fees) 
 Several Maasai households are facing problems 
following land sales due to extreme poverty, hunger 
and court cases 
 Only a few Maasai widows have a title deed; usually 
only non-Maasai women (groups, the rich) are able to 
buy land 
Indirect 
 Split households have less labour available for herding 
 Land sellers are buying more livestock, resulting in 
higher densities on already overstocked farms 
 Some new activities threaten the area’s carrying 
capacity (e.g. flower production) 
 Poverty has a detrimental effect on the environment 
(e.g. charcoal burning) 
 Loss of land is pushing many Maasai into wage 
employment where they cannot compete due to a lack 
of education 
 An influx of outsiders is creating tensions between 
ethnic groups; political patrons can easily instigate 
clashes 
 Land sales can result in poverty of a more structural 
nature but herds – unlike land – can be rebuilt 
 
International policy makers should understand 
that providing funds to establish a land titles re-
gister is only one side of the coin. The land re-
gister funds need to come with the understanding 
that some of the money is allocated to district-
wide discussions concerning the consequences of 
the proposed new land-tenure setting. The Maasai 
experience shows that De Soto’s claim that the 
hidden wealth of the poor can be brought to the 
surface by simply formalizing their property deeds 
is rather short-sighted. A whole range of other 
arrangements need to be put in place too. For 
example, financial institutions need to be willing to 
lend money to (illiterate) landowners, and at rea-
sonable interest rates. 
Corrupt practices in formal land registration do 
not help to build confidence in the formal land-
tenure system and a natural non-equilibrium envi-
ronment makes economic activities such as live-
stock keeping risky and can quickly result in loan 
arrears. The failure of World Bank managers to 
run profitable businesses on Maasai ranches in 
the 1960s and 1970s is proof that formal property 
rights do not work well in semi-arid areas. As long 
as these risks create an uncertain business cli-
mate that undermines investments, the introduc-
tion of formal property rights will not be able to act 
as a panacea for wealth creation in these regions. 
On the contrary, the evidence presented here 
shows that the opposite, i.e. a loss of wealth, is 
more likely. For now, besides educating Maasai 
landowners about the value of land, the best the 
Maasai youngsters can hope for is that their 
parents will value the wealth they still own. As for 
De Soto’s claim that formalized property rights will 
do the trick, let us hope that Kenya’s experience is 
an exception to the rule. 
 
 
Billboards warning Maasai not to sell their land 
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